We argue, however, that the ‘Problem of Legitimacy’ has been replaced by the ‘Problem of Extension’ – that is, by a tendency to dissolve the boundary between experts and the public so that there are no longer any grounds for limiting the indefinite extension of technical decision-making rights. We argue that a Third Wave of Science Studies – Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) – is needed to solve the Problem of Extension. SEE will include a normative theory of expertise, and will disentangle expertise from political rights in technical decision-making. The theory builds categories of expertise, starting with the key distinction between interactive expertise and contributory expertise. A new categorization of types of science is also needed.
This paper is not about social relations between scientists and society.
...Though science studies has resolved the Problem of Legitimacy by showing that the basis of technical decision-making can and should be widened beyond the core of certified experts, it has failed to solve the Problem of Extension: ‘How far should participation in technical decision-making extend?’ In other words, science studies has shown that there is more to scienti?c and technical expertise than is encompassed in the work of formally accredited scientists and technologists, but it has not told us how much more.
три социологические волны изучения науки
The First Wave of Science Studies
In the 1950s and 1960s, social analysts generally aimed at understanding, explaining and effectively reinforcing the success of the sciences, rather than questioning their basis. ...This wave of ‘positivism’ began to run into shallow academic waters in the late 1960s with Thomas Kuhn’s book and all that followed.
The Second Wave of Science Studies
The following wave of science studies, which has run from the early 1970s, and continues to run today... What has been shown under Wave Two is that it is necessary to draw on ‘extra-scientific factors’ to bring about the closure of scientific and technical debates – scientific method, experiments, observations, and theories are not enough. With science
reconceptualized as a social activity, science studies has directed attention to the uses of scientific knowledge in social institutions such as courts of law, schools, and policy processes such as public inquiries. The emphasis on the ‘social construction’ of science has meant, however, that when expertise is discussed, the focus is often on the attribution of the label ‘expert’, and on the way the locus of legitimated expertise is made to move between institutions.
...the Third Wave of Science Studies must emphasize the role of expertise as an analyst’s category as well as an actor’s category, and this will allow prescriptive, rather than merely descriptive, statements about the role of expertise in the public sphere.
...Because of the experimenter’s regress, the class of successful replications of an experiment can be identified only with hindsight; because of the expert’s regress, the class of experts can be identified only with hindsight. The trouble is that the expert’s regress gives no more positive help with the problem of technical decision-making in the public domain than the experimenter’s regress gives positive help with settling scientific controversies.
...One of the current authors (HMC) has discussed it in the course of his work on artificial intelligence (AI). Here, rather than reflecting upon the way the controversy about AI unfolded, he found himself taking an active part in the controversy, using his knowledge about knowledge to contribute to the debate. He referred to this activity, in contrast with more reflective science studies, as ‘knowledge science’. We might say that in knowledge science one works to affect the flow of the river of history, rather than examining its turns and eddies.
Wave Two deals with the problem: ‘How is scientific consensus formed?’ Some form of relativism in respect of the outcome of that consensus is vital if the answer is not to risk circularity. Wave Three deals with the problem: ‘How do you make decisions based on scientific knowledge before there is an absolute scientific consensus?’ Wave Three does not replace Wave Two because the problems are different. For Wave Three, something in addition to relativism is
...There are those who would not accept that scientists have any special rights even in these esoteric matters, but here we must simply state our starting point that, as members of the scientific community broadly conceived, and contributors to Western scientific society, ‘we think they do’. This is a reference to our culture, not a reference to the way political legitimacy is granted in our society. Should any politicians ever want to dismantle the right of the scientific community to settle esoteric issues within science, we would want to flght them.
об эзотеричности науки, редукционистский и прагматический подход
Science and Art
Later on, we will consider kinds of expertise that are different to those found in the esoteric sciences. At this point, however, it is worth noting something interesting in the comments made to us. It was suggested that restricting the circle of judges, in the case of esoteric science, to the coreset, is equivalent to restricting the circle of judges, in the case of ‘the bed’, to those with training and exposure to appropriate gallery-going.
In language we will explain more fully later in the paper, this is a class of experts with ‘interactional expertise’ rather than ‘contributory expertise’. It may be that this is one of the ways in which science and art are different. The end-point of art, after all, is to be experienced, and that is why it is reasonable to suppose that those with special viewing, or
experiencing, expertise – critics – rather than those with special creative expertise – artists – would be the best judges.
Science, on the other hand, is less obviously directed at consumers, and it is less clear that the audience has so much in the way of interpretative rights where science is concerned.
...Setting aside Lysenkoism and the like – still seen as pathologies by members of Western scientific society – one would never set out to design scientific or political institutions to enhance the influence of ‘big-P’ politics on the content of such an esoteric science: one would do quite the opposite. We might say that the SSK (социология науки) studies show that politics is ‘intrinsic’ to science, but they do not license ‘extrinsic’ political influence.
типы представлений об экспертном знании
...In esoteric sciences which are controversial, the public merely watches as disputes play out, but when the science becomes popularized, the apex of certainty becomes public property. The next generation of scientists are also introduced to these certainties by textbook writers who collapse the time dimension of the science they write about. It is only the apex of certainty that is visible to these new generations, and all the preceding years of experimentation and argument disappear into it.
...Both kinds of breaching experiment show that scientists rely on ordinary reasoning to bring their technical arguments to a conclusion, and this closes the gap between science and the rest of us. Suddenly, the conclusions formally wrought by science alone are the property of everyone, and each has a right to contribute their opinion along with that of the no-longer-so-special scientists.
The Third Wave of Science Studies?
The Third Wave of Science Studies, SEE, turns, as we have said, on a normative theory of expertise. ...Wave Three separates the scientific and technical input to decision-making from the political input. ...Wave Three, to reconstruct knowledge, not rediscover it. ... The wider scientific community no longer plays any special part in the decision-making process. Henceforward, in our treatment, the wider scientific community is indistinguishable from the citizenry in general.
...the wider scientific community should be seen as indistinguishable from the citizenry as a whole; the idea that scientists have special authority purely in virtue of their scientific qualifications and training has often been misleading and damaging. Scientists, as scientists, have nothing special to offer toward technical decision-making in the public domain where the specialisms are not their own; therefore scientists as a group are found in the bottom half
of the diagram. In making this clear, Wave Three differs markedly from Wave One.
...More difficult, one might have huge experience at drawing up astrological charts, but one would not want to say that this gives one the kind of expertise that enables one to contribute to technical decision-making in the public domain. Why not? Here, unlike lying in bed, an esoteric skill has been mastered which could not be mimicked by just anyone – at least not to the extent that it could pass among skilled practitioners of astrological charts. Astrology is, rather, disqualified by its content. It is hard to say much about which kinds of expertise are excluded in this way, but we can say something.
пять типов экспертизы по Турнеру
...For Turner, the first kind of expertise (Type I) is like that of physics, which has gained a kind of universal authority across society in virtue of what everyone believes to be its efficacy. Type II expertise has been granted legitimacy only among a restricted group or sect of adherents; Turner gives theology as his example, and we might put astrological expertise in the same category. Type III experts, such as new kinds of health or psychological ‘therapist’, create their own adherents, or groups of followers. Type IV and Type V experts have their adherents created for them by professional agencies which set themselves up to promote a new kind of expert, or, like government departments, become specialist consumers of new kinds of expertise.
Thus, to begin with, by reflecting on certain sociologists’ fieldwork experiences, we can distinguish three levels of expertise:
1) No Expertise: That is the degree of expertise with which the fieldworker sets out; it is insuf?cient to conduct a sociological analysis or do quasi-participatory fieldwork.
2) Interactional Expertise: This means enough expertise to interact interestingly with participants and carry out a sociological analysis.
3) Contributory Expertise: This means enough expertise to contribute to the science of the field being analysed.
...Having accepted that to categorize expertise makes sense in spite of the boundary problems, the task is to begin to work out what these types of expertise mean and how they fit together. For example, having interactional expertise does not give one contributory expertise, but one might think the former was a necessary condition for the latter. But it may not be! We will work out some of these differences by referring to what is fast becoming the paradigm study of so-called ‘lay expertise’ – Brian Wynne’s study of the relationship between scientists and sheep farmers after the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster contaminated the Cumbrian fells.
We have two theses:
Thesis 1: Only one set of experts need have interactional competence in the expertise of another set of experts for a combination of contributory expertises to take place.
Thesis 2: In such a case, only the party with the interactional expertise can take responsibility for combining the expertises.
Thesis 3: In such circumstances the party without the interactional expertise in respect of the other party should be represented by someone with enough interactional expertise to make sure the combination is done with integrity.
Thesis 4: A necessary but not sufficient condition of translation is the achievement of interactional expertise in each of the fields between which translation is to be accomplished.
...Quite simply, scientists’ supposed referred expertise about fields of science distant from their own is nearly always based on mythologies about science, rather than on science itself.
...Esoteric and Controversial Sciences
In public-use technologies and planning, the involvement of the public as experts is ‘integral’ to the science itself. Now let us return to sciences where this is not so. At a ?rst approach, four kinds of science of this type can be distinguished. To these we will apply the labels ‘normal science’, ‘Golem science’, ‘historical science’ and ‘reflexive historical science’.
...Golem science is science which has the potential to become normal science, but has not yet reached closure to the satisfaction of the core-set. ...For example, in the debate over genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the argument about whether rats’ stomach linings are affected by certain kinds of genetically modified potatoes is science of this kind; in the BSE (‘mad cow’) debate, the question of the strength of the causal link between BSE and Creutzfeld-Jacob disease is science of this kind.
...Historical sciences, on the other hand, are those in which it is not to be expected that there will be any closure in the core-set debate in the foreseeable future. Such sciences have also been understood for a long time, even though new developments in science and technology have brought them much more to the fore in recent decades. Historical sciences
deal with unique historical trends rather than repeatable laboratory tests. The question of global warming is a historical question; long-term weather forecasting is a historical science; the ecological effects, as opposed to the effects on single organisms, of GMOs is a historical problem.
In reflexive historical sciences, the potential for uncertainty becomes even greater, as the long-term outcomes are affected by the actions of humans themselves. For example, the science of global warming, as well as being historical (as just explained), is also reflexive. This means that the input variables will include the outcome of political and ethical debates among humans.
When an environmental decision has to be made, Golem and historical science are in some ways similar and in some ways different. They are similar in as far as the scientific input is equally uncertain; but they are different in that the certainty which Golem science can eventually reach through normal scientific processes, cannot be attained in historical sciences. In reflexive historical sciences it cannot be approached without social or cultural regulation. Thus, in the case of all historical sciences, society needs certified and experience-based expertise in the scientific fields belonging to the problem, as well as political input; while in reflexive historical sciences, politics, policy, regulation and sociology enter in the top half of the diagram – expertises in the sciences of politics, policy, and so forth, are needed, as well as political input in the more ordinary sense.
We have argued that, although science studies has made an enormous contribution to our understanding of the relationship between science and society, there is more to do. Wave Two of Science Studies has shown us the many ways in which science cannot solve technical problems in the public domain. In particular, the speed of political decision-making is faster than the speed of scienti?c consensus formation. As a result of this emphasis, Wave Two’s predominant motif has been the need to legitimate technical decisions – to solve the Problem of Legitimacy. Decisions will have no legitimacy if they continue to follow the intellectually unsupportable, top-down, authoritarian model of Wave One. Nevertheless, it would be disastrous to solve the Problem of Legitimacy by dissolving the distinction between expertise and democracy. To do this would be to create a new Problem of Extension. We argue that expertise should feed into the decision-making process, but not in the old Wave One way; solving the Problem of Extension without re-erecting the Problem of Legitimacy depends on recognizing and using new kinds of expertise emerging from non-
professional sources. We argue that to do this we need a Third Wave of Science Studies, with the ability to develop a normative theory of expertise. Wave Two has been enormously successful, and continues to be enormously successful, in deconstructing knowledge; without abandoning Wave Two, we now need to reconstruct knowledge and develop Studies of Expertise and Experience – SEE.
...We begin to show what the components of such a theory might include. We show that we can classify scientific expertise into interactive expertise and contributory expertise. We show that these ideas emerge from sociologists’ own practice, and this offers one persuasive way into a normative theory. We develop some thesis-like propositions using this classi?cation of expertise. We also introduce the ideas of referred expertise, translation and discrimination. In discussing discrimination, we distinguish between ubiquitous and specialist knowledge that has been gathered as a result of local experience. Using these ideas, we argue that scientists as a class have no special contribution to make to technical decision-making in the public domain, and that if there are to be public defences of science, they should concentrate on scientists as specialists, rather than as generalists.
в связи с этим интересно посмотреть текст http://www.inliberty.ru/blog/svoboda/17
Глобальная нормализация общественной температуры
Дмитрий Бутрин http://zt.livejournal.com/373026.ht
"Наиболее любопытное в том, что происходит сейчас вокруг гипотезы антропогенного глобального воздействия (АГВ), — это не научная и не политическая стороны дела, а наглядная демонстрация порочности представления о возможности управлять общественными стереотипами, связанными с понятием «авторитета», будь он научный, политический или моральный.
...Именно на примере АГВ впервые может быть продемонстрирована иллюзорность надежд политического мира, что в связи с «информационным взрывом» возникнет совершенно новая и, казалось бы, абсолютно надежная возможность управлять общественным мнением. А это стоит намного дороже. То, как реагирует на тему «глобального потепления» глобальное общество, позволяет предположить, что соображения философов и политологов о грядущей «информационной диктатуре» правительств останутся не более чем предположениями — новый «информационный мир» оказывается на поверку ничем иным, как тем же миром, что и 40–50 лет назад, и правила игры в нем, соответственно, не изменились.
...как таковая гипотеза АГВ и «глобального потепления» своих сторонников в широких народных массах, судя по данным социологов, не потеряла. Произошло нечто другое: интерес к «горячей» теме, остовавшийся в течение нескольких последних лет неизменным, мгновенно упал.
...Странный, кажется, эффект — в мрачные пророчества адептов наиболее радикальных политических защитников идеи «спасения от глобального потепления», в общем-то, верит почти столько же людей, сколько и раньше. Вот только спасением они теперь отчего-то почти не интересуются — там, где ранее бушевал алармизм, воцарился стандартный скепсис: «Мы все умрем? Ну, хорошо. Будем все умирать — приходите, выпьем напоследок».
...Мне очень не хотелось бы ошибаться, однако моя гипотеза будет крайне оптимистичной: случай «климатгейта» показывает, что вопреки всем предположениям общественное мнение в XXI веке, в отличие от его первых годов, не будет демонстрировать «гиперлояльности» и «гиперсолидарности» по отношению к «власти» в широком понимании этого слова (а общественное мнение, кажется, явно склонно причислять сюда и ученых — в XX веке они в массовом порядке переходили под крыло государства не только в России). Предположения о «гиперлояльности» строились на неплохо подтверждающихся в последние годы гипотезах о возможности быстрой и эффективной манипуляции общественным мнением в связи с появлением новых каналов коммуникации. Первые годы «информационного общества» с его невиданной ранее свободой и дешевизной агитации в Интернете, с возросшей доступностью информационных каналов и склонностью массового пользователя к потреблению качественно «упакованной» информации, с выглядящей очевидной деатомизацией общества и ростом популярности общения и информационного обмена как времяпровождения подпитывали надежды политиков на облегчение условий своей работы. ...Не нужна кропотливая многолетняя работа с профсоюзными движениями, не нужны годы политической борьбы и оттачивание доктрин — слоганы новой власти напишут пользователи социальных сетей, они же создадут сетевые во всех смыслах структуры, а доблестные красные хакеры-энтузиасты DDoS-атаками на боевых PC сметут остатки присутствия капитализма в будущей свободной сети, где нет места эксплуатации человека человеком сверх меры.
Магия «информационного взрыва», который через контроль каналов коммуникации позволит осведомленному и просвещенному государству мобилизовать наконец членов подопечного общества на построение более безопасного, более управляемого и более предсказуемого мира, разумеется, не могла не захватить политиков.
...В случае с «климатгейтом», если я прав, случилось то же, что и с большинством модных поветрий предыдущего «урбанизационного взрыва» 20–50-х годов XX века, также сопровождавшегося «взрывом информационным». Гипотеза, ранее выглядевшая неоспоримо верной из-за массированной пропаганды своих сторонников, как это происходило и 100, и 200 лет назад, наконец обросла всем, что полагается солидной гипотезе, — в первую очередь, оппонирующим сообществом и содержательной критикой, которую ранее из-за воплей энтузиастов «новой информационной общности» было слышно довольно плохо. В этот момент из мечты о дивном новом мире она превратилась в то, чем ей и следует быть в мире старом и добром — в предположение, обсуждение которого обществом строится по привычной модели. Новейший гаджет оказался обычной проблемой — из которой мировую мечту, программу построения нового мира, всемирную панацею от всех бед вырастить так же сложно, как из банального мобильного телефона или кофейни Starbucks.